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iABSTRACT
The major trading nations have been busy with trade agreements—free, preferential, and bilateral—incorporating Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)-plus and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Internet Treaty 
provisions into their respective schedules, impacting the trade in digital intangible products. As communication networks have 
evolved from real-time, point-to-point dedicated circuit-switched connections over copper cable to complex multipoint, packet-
switched connections over distributed ﬁbre optic networks worldwide, the value and speed of communication has expanded 
exponentially. Now, complex audiovisual media services run over a series of layers in the packet-switched chain. Dominance 
is not just about control of the physical infrastructure layer but all layers of the Internet protocol stack from application and 
messaging to content layers where most of the intellectual property resides. But the question is—will such trade agreements 
take account of these nuanced changes and will they be stepping stones or stumbling blocks to any future multilateral provision 
on digital trade? 
This paper brieﬂy looks at some of the more recent and larger FTAs, although many of the operative provisions for some, such as 
the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), are still not in the public domain. Nevertheless, the wording of provisions in agreements, 
such as the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), provides a good overview of what has been achieved. Dispute 
resolution procedures in FTAs/PTAs are not uniform and there is concern that judgments, perhaps through private arbitration 
procedures, will create a patchwork of rules for digital trade. Certainly, the World Trade Organization (WTO) could strengthen 
its role in monitoring the performance and impact of the new PTAs on the horizon, in effect becoming a more signiﬁcant source 
of information on these agreements than previously and matching its existing strengths in adjudication and negotiation. 
Regulation in the communications sector has generally favoured separating content from infrastructure. Nevertheless, when it 
comes to delivering digital products (whether goods and/or services) over a network, the very nature of the delivery method 
requires a holistic view to traditionally separate goods and services regulation, content, and infrastructure regulation. This 
paper points to (a) expanding and deepening existing WTO commitments; (b) encouraging the WTO Secretariat to ensure 
that amendments to TiSA are made in line with existing General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) commitments and/or 
improving upon current provisions speciﬁcally for digital trade; or (c) pursuing a single new instrument for the digital economy.
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1INTRODUCTION
When E. M. Forster began writing Howards End before World 
War I in 1909, could he have imagined that the simple phrase 
“Only connect” he uses in the work could have resonance 
for the burgeoning development in digital trade seen 
today? Naturally, Forster was writing of something entirely 
different—the need to connect man’s internal and external 
desires. And yet, we see that this phrase is also apt for digital 
trade—the need for a nation state to ensure an effective 
communications network not only within its borders, but 
also to the wider Internet. Also, the transactions and content 
that ﬂow over such networks are directly correlated with 
Moore’s Law (Gordon Moore, co-founder of Intel), which 
talks of the density of transistors on an integrated circuit 
board, but perhaps indirectly of the beneﬁt of network 
externalities and the power of reaching millions of users 
through the effective interconnection of networks. 
The major trading nations have been busy with free trade 
agreements (FTAs)/preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
and bilateral trade agreements incorporating Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) plus and World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Internet Treaty 
provisions into their respective schedules, impacting the trade 
in digital intangible products. Many agreements talk of the 
interconnection of networks at both the physical and logical 
levels. As communication networks have evolved from real-
time, point-to-point dedicated circuit-switched connections 
over copper cable to complex multipoint, packet-switched 
connections over distributed ﬁbre optic networks worldwide, 
disassembling and assembling packets in near real time (but 
importantly not exact real time), the value and speed of 
communication has expanded exponentially. Now, complex 
audiovisual media services run over a series of layers in the 
packet-switched chain. Dominance is not just about control of 
the physical infrastructure layer but all layers of the Internet 
protocol stack from application and messaging to content 
layers where most of the intellectual property resides.1 But 
the question is—will such trade agreements take account of 
these nuanced changes and will they be stepping stones or 
stumbling blocks to any future multilateral provision on digital 
trade? 
This paper outlines some provisions on FTAs in Section 2 
before brieﬂy discussing new rules or ways of interpreting 
existing rules that impact digital trade, such as localisation 
(Section 3.1); the Information Technology Agreement 
(Section 3.2); classiﬁcation issues (Section 3.3); the Annex 
on Telecommunications (Section 3.4); and the regulatory 
Reference Paper (Section 3.5). The paper goes on to brieﬂy 
look at possible other approaches (Section 3.6), for example, 
expanding the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) or creating 
a new framework agreement for digital trade, and concludes 
with further thoughts in Section 4.
For an overview of the different layers of the Internet protocol stack, see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_protocol_suite.
TiSA is a “services only” agreement (building on the commitments in 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS]) and is not meant 
to cover IP (although there may be some cross-reference with domain 
names in any e-commerce chapter to be agreed, but this remains to 
be conﬁrmed). The text of the TPP was released on the 5th November 
2015.See http://www.tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text.
The TTIP includes IP as “investment assets” in Chapter Y. There will be 
a separate IP chapter. The EU’s main IP concerns include geographical 
indications; anti-bad-faith registration of trademarks; and customs 
enforcement, including counterfeit goods in small consignments. 
Copyright issues include remuneration rights for broadcasting and 
communication to the public (public performance) for performers and 
producers in phonograms; a full right of communication to the public 
(public performance) for authors in bars, restaurants, and shops; and 
a resale right for creators of original works of art. See EU negotiating 
position paper (March 2015) on the TTIP, http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153331.7%20IPR%20EU%20
position%20paper%2020%20March%202015.pdf.
1
2
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Bilateral (for example, the Korea-United States [US] 
agreement, or KORUS) and FTA negotiations include 
e-commerce chapters (all US and European Union [EU] FTAs) 
that bypass the stalled Doha Round talks. The Trans Paciﬁc 
Partnership (TPP), and the US-EU Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) as currently proposed would 
extend the levels of protection for a range of intellectual 
property (IP) rights.2 
•	 Copyright—life	of	author	plus	70	years	(Article	18	KORUS;	
Chapter 18, Article 18.6.3 (b)(i) TPP).
•	 Contain	improved	enforcement	provisions	(KORUS	Article	
18.10; pre-established damages high enough to deter 
counterfeiting and piracy and compensate rights holders 
for loss, including criminal penalties for wilful copyright 
infringement and trademark counterfeiting). The TPP is 
expected to boost IP standards and commitments on 
enforcement (Chapter 18, Articles 18.71-18.75).3 
•	 Incorporate	the	WIPO	Internet	Treaty	provisions	for:	
- Liability of Internet intermediaries (also safe harbour 
for Internet service providers [ISPs] who are unaware 
of hosting IP infringing content and do not own, 
initiate, or control distribution of pirated material 
by including takedown provisions on notice) (TPP 
Chapter 18, Article 18.82, Annex 18-E and Annex 18-F; 
KORUS 18.1);
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2or bilateral or multilateral Internet exchange points); and 
dialling parity. Further, certain bilateral/regional FTAs (US-
Japan, US-Korea, and EU-US), the KORUS (Article 18.4), the 
TiSA (at the time of writing—Article 7 Annex on Electronic 
Commerce and Articles 5 and 17 Annex on Telecommunication 
Services), and the TTIP (Article 42) incorporate speciﬁc Internet 
principles on interoperability; free ﬂow of data; and non-
discriminatory allocation of spectrum. However, does this go 
far enough or do we need a new set of rules laid out in a single 
instrument, or perhaps extend current deﬁnitions already in 
the WTO-covered instruments?
- Treaty exceptions for copyright (referring speciﬁcally 
to Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, that is, 
the right of a member state to include limitations or 
exceptions under national law to rights granted to 
authors. In some FTAs, such as the TTP in Chapter 18, 
Article 18.66, the exceptions to copyright are quite 
extensive);4 and
- Abusive domain-name registration.
At the time of writing, many speciﬁc details of the mega FTAs 
are still not in the public domain. However, it is clear that 
with the successful incorporation of WIPO Internet Treaty 
provisions into many of them (at the drafting stage), the 
question arises as to whether it is now just a short step to 
folding the WIPO Internet treaties into the TRIPS itself? 
FTAs (KORUS Articles 13.5, 13.7) incorporate provisions on 
cross-border data ﬂows, reﬂecting World Trade Organization 
(WTO) commitments on data transfers for ﬁnancial 
services (the KORUS expands from the Financial Services 
Annex where cross-border data ﬂows are required in the 
ordinary course of business—but no requirement to balance 
with privacy obligation to protect personal data—though 
remaining subject to Article XIV of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services [GATS] exception on data). The TPP is 
pursuing nonlocalisation rules for data and data centres as a 
requirement of investment, and reﬂected in provisions on the 
use of public telecommunication systems for the movement 
of information cross-border (Chapter 13, Article 13.4(3)), 
and cross-border (Chapter 13, Article 13.4(3), cross-border 
transfer of information by electronic means for e-commerce 
and location of computing facilities (Chapter 14, Articles 
14.11 and 14.13) (see also TTIP Articles 48, 56; TiSA X3-X6). 
Most FTAs (KORUS Article 15; TTIP Article 63; TiSA Annex on 
E-Commerce) incorporate e-commerce chapters that allow 
parties to use their own authentication of digital signature 
methods. Some FTAs require authentication to comply with 
legitimate government objectives. Some FTAs (KORUS Articles 
1, and 18; the Korea-Singapore and Chile-Australia bilateral 
treaties) use a negative list approach (asking countries to state 
what services, activities, or laws are not subject to the FTA 
rules, allowing for wider capture) as opposed to a positive 
list approach (asking governments to specify exactly which 
services and sectors will be covered by the rules). Also, some 
FTAs use standstill provisions (governments will be bound 
by existing levels of liberalisation and cannot introduce new 
restrictions) and ratchet provisions (when a government 
reduces restrictions on foreign ﬁrms, those will automatically 
be bound in and may apply to other FTA countries on a most-
favoured nation [MFN] basis).
Some FTAs (KORUS Article 14.7–14.10; TTIP Article 44; TiSA 
Annex on Telecommunication Services) have incorporated 
additional rules to the telecommunications regulatory 
Reference Paper (RP), including commitments on local loop 
unbundling (LLU, or leasing part of the incumbent’s network, 
reducing costs of interconnection); co-location (sharing of 
network facilities such as points of interconnection at telehuts 
The TPP was the ﬁrst US trade agreement that required parties to 
seek an appropriate balance in their copyright systems in providing 
copyright exceptions and limitations for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. See press 
release “USTR Introduces New Copyright Exceptions and Limitations 
Provision at San Diego TPP Talks,” July 2012.
4
LOCALISATION 
Multinational companies keen on cross-border data 
transfers and anti-localisation provisions would also balk 
at blocks to data transfers by member states keen to keep 
data local. In a range of FTAs and bilaterals, a number of 
the more powerful states, including the US, have restricted 
use of performance requirements by developing countries 
associated with processing data and to keep data local. 
Often, those states wishing to promote cross-border data 
transfers rely on the Annex on Telecommunications (AT) 
and the Annex on Financial Services (AF) agreements that 
protect cross-border data ﬂow in the ordinary course of 
business. But these annexes talk of data transfers over public 
telecommunications transport services being in real time. 
With complex packet-switched networks, data transfer is not 
real time—packets are disassembled and transmitted through 
a series of routers whether by way of private Virtual Private 
Networks or over the public Internet, mostly through a store 
and forward mechanism, and reassembled at their points 
of delivery. This is not exactly real time. Is this a problem? 
Perhaps not; this is the way Transmission Control Protocol/
Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) networks function, and it is 
merely incidental that transmission is not real time. Also, as 
mentioned, the AT talks of communication via any protocol 
of choice. 
However, the AT as currently drafted does distinguish 
between data that is traffic data —data that does not 
involve any end-to-end change in its form or content of the 
customer’s information—and other forms of data where 
additional processing to content and form may have taken 
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3place, for example, from ﬁrst input of the data to ﬁnal 
delivery at a distant point of network presence. Clause 5(c) 
of the AT (and therefore the AF, which relies on the AT 
to provide the telecommunications transport services for 
communication of ﬁnancial data) supports cross-border 
transfers. Nevertheless, this provision might only cover the 
transport of data where there has been no “change in the 
form of content of the customer’s information.” Such an 
interpretation, if correct, could exclude a number of forms of 
data generated by services other than telecommunications 
and where there has been a change in the customer’s 
information. The implication of this is that states such as 
China, Russia, Nigeria, and others who enforce full or partial 
data localisation laws, and consequently who may face 
potential future requests for dispute resolution by WTO 
member states for breach of the AT/AF, could argue that 
the WTO provisions do not cover any customer information 
data where there has been change and/or amendment in that 
data, but only ‘network trafﬁc’ data.  
In a report on the costs of data localisation by the European 
Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), ECIPE 
argues that the economic impact in terms of loss to gross 
domestic product (GDP) and investment for countries 
imposing data localisation laws could be considerable 
and could also have signiﬁcant knock-on effects on 
international services, such as cloud (Bauer et al. 2014). 
States promoting data localisation laws may argue that 
keeping data local may serve the public interest in that 
network security and privacy of data are better protected. 
Telehuts, Internet exchanges, and private and public peering 
points where networks interconnect and exchange trafﬁc 
may be better protected locally with better control of the 
security clearance of network engineers who gain access to 
such physical infrastructure, but in reality a network can be 
intercepted anywhere. Like goods, data gathers inputs from 
all parts of the global value chain. Harmonising provisions 
on cross-border data ﬂows in all the major trade agreements 
currently being negotiated would be a step forward, but 
these provisions should also be reﬂected in a decision, 
understanding, or reference paper within the GATS (see 
Section 3.5 on the RP). In other words, a revised RP to the 
GATS could include speciﬁc additional provisions on ensuring 
no restrictions to cross-border data ﬂows and minimising 
localisation requirements reﬂecting best practice from FTAs/
PTAs, but making clear whether all forms of data, or only 
certain categories of data, are captured.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENT
We could extend the WTO’s International Technology 
Agreement (ITA), a plurilateral agreement involving 76 
WTO members representing 97 percent of worldwide trade 
in information and communication technologies (ICTs). 
The ITA calls for a reduction of tariffs to zero on a range of 
ICT goods. An updated ITA would involve coded key cards 
to access Internet content such as software, machines for 
optical ﬁbre for cables, and for semiconductors to drive 
down the costs of computer and mobile device access to 
the Internet. In his paper, “Future-prooﬁng World Trade in 
Technology,” Lee-Makiyama (2011) argues that the ITA could 
be extended by converting it into an International Digital 
Economy Agreement (IDEA). He says that “while there is 
no universally agreed deﬁnition of ICT services as such, it 
should at least include computer and related services (CRS) 
and telecommunication services.” Lee-Makiyama holds 
that there is a strong case for including commitments on 
CRS in the ITA. Integrating the two would certainly provide 
for a more holistic approach to digital economy services, 
which not only require access to telecommunications 
infrastructure at the physical layer but also to the higher 
layers, particularly applications, where computer services 
would be signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, such a suggestion is 
likely to be stifﬂy opposed by the hardware community, 
which is much better represented in trade policy circles than 
the services community. Besides including CRS services, he 
also argues for incorporating speciﬁc telecommunication 
instruments, such as the Telecommunications Annex and 
the regulatory RP. Finally, Lee-Makiyama contends that the 
inclusion of GATS Mode 4 (movement of natural persons) 
is important to an IDEA. Again, there are political difﬁculties 
with this, given, for example, restrictions on United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) commitments unless the US 
Congress allows for expansion into Mode 4. Nevertheless, 
there has been support for increasing the number and type of 
visa classiﬁcations as part of the TTIP.
Digital and technology companies advocate increasing 
the number of H1-B visas granted each year. Some 
industry groups also have proposed clarifying, 
harmonizing, and broadening the deﬁnition of business 
visitors, or creating new visa classiﬁcations, as part of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
(USITC 2014). 
CLASSIFICATION 
The issue of classiﬁcation of electronic intangibles has also 
proved to be a thorny issue in the WTO. Some states, such 
as the US, argue for a General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)-based deﬁnition, whereas others, such as the 
European Communities, argue for a GATS-based deﬁnition, 
mainly to preserve cultural safeguards on the import of 
audiovisual media products. The approach taken in FTAs and 
bilaterals appears to avoid the classiﬁcation issue completely 
by incorporating speciﬁc schedules on e-commerce and 
where all provisions refer to “digital products” (Wunsch-
Vincent 2008). 
In the WTO case China-Audiovisual, the Appellate 
Body found that the mode of delivery on hardcopy 
cinematographic ﬁlm raised GATT issues, implying that 
delivering the ﬁlm online would have excluded the 
4application of the GATT. The GATS, however, is implied as 
being technologically neutral (as to means of delivery) for 
scheduled commitments of services (that is, it applies to 
online products in the absence of tabled restrictions). 
Nevertheless, if the GATT was to apply to the trade in 
electronic intangibles, should there be a de minimis level 
below which customs duties are not applied? Border 
measures can increase the costs associated with smaller 
transactions that can discourage digitally enabled trade. 
Raising the de minimis levels would be advantageous to 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and technology-
enabled small business trade. A report by the US 
International Trade Commission states:
One study shows that increasing the US de minimis level 
to $800 would increase the value of transactions handled 
by express delivery ﬁrms by over 8 percent for 48 different 
types of merchandise. This point also has been made in 
connection with the TTIP negotiations, where industry 
representatives have stated that a higher de minimis 
level will “enable consumers and businesses on both sides 
of the Atlantic to take full advantage of the potential of 
e-commerce”. (USITC 2014: 177, footnote 125, FedEx, 
written comments to the USTR, 10 May 2013, p. 3)
If a de minimis is to apply, should it be for all countries or 
should it only be available to developing countries and/or 
least developed countries as a special and differential right? 
The imposition of customs duties has proven to be a problem 
for developing countries, for example with the importation of 
low-value goods. 
Further, should the current moratorium on imposing 
customs duties on e-commerce transmissions continue? 
The moratorium has gone through several extensions, 
and following the WTO Bali Ministerial Conference in 
2013 was again extended. However, there is no universal 
consent between WTO member states as to whether the 
moratorium applies to all electronic intangibles or only 
to a specific category of downloadable content. Some US 
operators consider that the moratorium applies also to 
Internet interconnection, and that any access fees on data 
transmission would be forbidden by the moratorium (USITC 
2014). The approach taken in the majority of e-commerce 
chapters in FTAs is to apply the moratorium on customs 
duties to all digital products. 
By contrast, if the GATS were to apply to electronic 
intangibles, would existing members’ scheduled 
commitments cover access to Internet services? During 
the discussion of the Work Programme on E-Commerce, 
some GATS members argued that the GATS obligations 
and commitments undertaken in 1994 could not apply 
to services transmitted by a technology that was not yet 
envisioned at the time of the negotiations (namely, the 
Internet). In ongoing negotiations, WTO members could opt 
for combinations of a positive and negative list approach for 
scheduling service trade commitments, that is entering broad 
commitments at the two-digit Central Product Classiﬁcation 
(CPC) level, while carefully listing certain exemptions 
using full CPC codes (See Wunsch-Vincent 2006). The US-
Gambling case conﬁrms that GATS Mode 1 applies to all 
cross-border Internet transactions (as opposed to Mode 
2: consumption abroad). Also, US-Gambling conﬁrms that 
scheduled commitments should be made under WS 120/
CPC and that members will by default use the W/120 or an 
equally precise classiﬁcation system in future negotiations 
and follow the GATS Scheduling Guidelines, or state clearly if 
they move away from these accepted deﬁnitions.5 
The question is whether existing GATS classiﬁcation codes 
take account of convergence in services. One could question 
whether the old-world GATS distinction between basic and 
enhanced (value-added services) is as relevant anymore in 
the light of complex services that run over packet-switched 
data networks. Is there a need to distinguish between basic 
Internet connectivity on the one hand (packet-switched data 
transmission services) and code and protocol conversion, 
or online information and database retrieval given that 
they could all function seamlessly on the same network but 
at different layers? We could envisage revised Schedules 
of Speciﬁc Commitments combining both, but also new 
commitments drawn together in clusters of network-based 
services. Given that many intangible goods, such as e-books, 
are made up of services inputs, a clustered approach to 
network-based services in drafting commitments could give 
a clearer picture on market access in the digital economy by 
member states. In this way, trade negotiators could see at 
a glance what offers are being made in the digital economy. 
Further, as states’ domestic regulatory frameworks become 
more complex to handle such services, we are likely to see 
increasing friction from domestic regulation raising barriers 
to trade under Article VI of the GATS. The suggestion would 
be to review the WS 120/CPC scheduling guidelines to 
update for new converged services and perhaps to ﬁll any 
gaps in “interpretation” by way of collective decisions made 
by the WTO Ministerial Council and/or the General Council 
under Art IX:2 of the WTO General Agreement, although this 
could be unwieldy.
ANNEX ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS
For telecommunications, so crucial for digital economy 
services to ﬂourish, the US has been particularly critical of 
WTO member state commitments in the sector. The USITC 
paper “Digital Trade in the US and Global Economies” cites a 
view from a senior AT&T executive.
The Appellate Body in US-Gambling (AB-2005-1, April 2005) makes 
clear at para 203: “The Scheduling Guidelines thus underline the 
importance of using a common format and terminology in scheduling, 
and express a clear preference for parties to use W/120 and the CPC 
classiﬁcations in their Schedules. At the same time, the Guidelines make 
clear that parties wanting to use their own sub-sectoral classiﬁcation or 
deﬁnitions—that is, to disaggregate in a way that diverges from W/120 
and/or the CPC—were to do so in a “sufﬁciently detailed” way “to avoid 
any ambiguity as to the scope of the commitment”.  
5
5Mr. Loeb noted that many countries have opened their 
telecommunications markets due to their adoption of 
the WTO Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement 
and are now receiving signiﬁcant economic beneﬁts. 
Mr. Loeb also noted that a signiﬁcant number of WTO 
members have made only limited commitments in basic 
telecommunications sector. He said that countries should 
be encouraged to allow full market access for all basic 
telecommunications services, with no restrictions on 
foreign capital investment, and adhere to the regulatory 
principles of basic telecommunications services listed in 
the WTO Reference Paper. (USITC 2014)
Despite these criticisms, there are provisions in the WTO 
instruments that have been underutilised. For example, the 
WTO Annex on Telecoms talks of using any protocol of choice 
in the delivery of services over public telecommunication 
networks and scheduled in a member’s schedule of speciﬁc 
commitments. This is an incredibly powerful and far-sighted 
provision dropped by the early drafters into the Annex and 
reﬂected now in some telecommunications schedules of the 
new trade agreements (KORUS Article 14.2; TiSA Annex on 
Telecommunications Article 10). The early GATS drafters 
could not have envisaged the wide array of applications, 
for example, Java, HTTP, FTP that we see today. And yet 
potentially all of these applications are covered by this 
simple wording. The WTO Annex on Telecommunications is 
an insurance policy for providers of services requiring access 
to a basic telecommunications network to deliver enhanced 
or value-added services, whether ﬁnancial, distribution, legal, 
and so on. Interpreting the Annex in a new way by the WTO 
Trade in Services Committee issuing further guidelines on its 
operating provisions (for example, in clarifying terms such 
as “protocol of choice”) might help bring further certainty 
as to the extent to which new Internet services are already 
covered. Alternatively, the issue could be tested through 
dispute resolution. 
REFERENCE PAPER
By contrast, the Basic Agreement on Telecommunications 
covers basic telephony services and incorporates further 
commitments on telecommunications services post the 
Uruguay Round. Also, there is the additional commitment in 
the form of the regulatory RP (a combination of competition 
safeguards, including provisions on abuse by a major supplier 
and cross-subsidisation; licensing; access to spectrum; and 
universal service, among others). According to the WTO:
 
A total of 108 WTO members have made commitments 
to facilitate trade in telecommunications services. This 
includes the establishment of new telecoms companies; 
foreign direct investment in existing companies; and 
cross-border transmission of telecoms services. Out 
of this total, 99 members have committed to extend 
competition in basic telecommunications (e.g. ﬁxed 
and mobile telephony, real-time data transmission, and 
the sale of leased-circuit capacity). In addition, 82 WTO 
members have committed to the regulatory principles 
spelled out in the “Reference Paper”, a blueprint for 
sector reform that largely reﬂects “best practice” in 
telecoms regulation.6  
Certainly more states have made commitments in basic 
services than in value-added services, but importantly 94–95 
states have committed in data transmission services and 97 
in mobile cellular services, both signiﬁcant to the predicted 
and rapid growth in services over the mobile Internet. Mobile 
Internet penetration is expected to reach 71 percent by 2019 
(Enders and Porges 2015). 
 
There is no doubt that the success of these commitments 
has led to the massive growth of telecommunication 
services around the world. However despite that success, 
is the RP ﬁt for the purpose of digital trade? Can it capture 
the sophistication of mergers and joint ventures that result 
in the most complex combination of services operating at 
multiple points of the Internet protocol stack as provided 
by Google, Facebook, Microsoft or Virgin Media? Not really; 
it is meant to cover basic services. The RP talks of super-
dominance and access to and control of an ‘essential facility’. 
This is more about control of infrastructure and less about 
control over the access gateways of the Internet, both 
physical and logical. We need something more nuanced 
that is able to cover complex packet-switched networks. 
Otherwise, we may have to leave to dispute resolution to 
resolve interpretation conﬂicts in much the same way as 
the panel in US-Telmex passed judgment on the meaning 
of cost-orientation for telecommunications carrier trafﬁc, 
simultaneously blowing away the gentleman’s agreement 
on accounting rates for cross-border interconnection of 
public telecommunication networks between member-state 
national carriers. 
A number of WTO member states, including the US, have 
inscribed packet-switched data services as a basic service 
in their schedules of speciﬁc commitments. All it takes is 
a further case brought to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) challenging the meaning of such a commitment. 
If true, and classed as a basic service under the regulatory 
capture of the RP, would this mean that those international 
operators, predominantly US-based, who control the 
international backbone networks for Internet trafﬁc would 
have to negotiate on cost-orientated rates requiring 
renegotiation of their conﬁdential transit agreements and 
effectively requiring them to interconnect on cost-based 
rates? This would be a game changer for cash-strapped 
Internet operators in the developing world. 
One way forward could be to model a new RP on Internet 
principles speciﬁcally for digital trade and ask members who 
have already accepted the current RP to consider accepting a 
See WTO website, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/
telecom_e/telecom_e.htm.
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6revised version as a form of additional commitment (Article 
XVIII of the GATS) to their current schedules of speciﬁc 
commitments (or revised schedules). For example, a group of 
like-minded states could extend such provisions on an MFN 
basis.
Also, members could agree opening up the RP to apply to 
both basic and value-added services, or continue the current 
restriction of the RP to “basic public telecommunication 
services” only but with additional guidelines,7 for example, 
that the revised RP would apply to all “publicly available” 
networks and services. This would mean any system whose 
telephone numbers (or IP addresses) are listed in a publicly 
available numbering plan. As such, all Internet networks that 
list IP addresses in a publicly available “national” numbering 
plan (available by way of the member-state regulator) will be 
“public systems” and therefore under the capture of the RP. 
A revised RP could include extra telecom provisions (now 
part of some FTAs), such as commitments on local loop 
unbundling, co-location, and dialling parity discussed above. 
A revised RP could also include new speciﬁc rules on network 
neutrality and media concentration. It could include rules 
for an open Internet, using developing global standards that 
encourage interoperability of devices and content across 
networks (see, for example, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development recommendations on 
interoperability—not an “international standard” as per 
the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade). As 
part of new interoperability provisions, a revised RP could 
incorporate provisions on mandated access to networks8 
(in the event of an access bottleneck) even when a network 
operator is not a “major supplier” (this could also appear 
as an interconnection obligation and within the powers of 
a national regulatory authority). As mentioned, some FTAs 
(US-Japan, the KORUS, and EU-US) already incorporate 
Internet principles on interoperability; free ﬂow of data; and 
non-discriminatory allocation of spectrum, all of which could 
be incorporated into a revised RP.
The competition provisions of the RP could also be greatly 
enhanced. The current RP in its reference to major suppliers 
talks of “super-dominance” and “access to and control of 
an essential facility.” However, we need something more 
nuanced to cover packet-switched data communications 
and applications running across several layers of the TCP/
IP stack. In an earlier work, the author proposed a layered 
approach to network/services competition (Kariyawasam 
2012). This would be “blue-skies” thinking and would take a 
radically different approach to the regulation of competition 
for network-based services as seen in the current form of the 
RP. However, change is needed as two of the most current 
important developments in Internet architecture (and they 
will have signiﬁcant implications for digital trade) are the 
migration of legacy Internet networks to a new breed of 
next-generation networks (NGNs), and the exhaustion of 
legacy Internet IPv4 addresses. 
The single most important driver of change is the 
convergence of the network, with an integrated IP-based 
NGN delivering a combination of data, voice, and video. 
This migration to NGNs makes it possible for different 
underlying platforms (for example, ﬁxed telecommunications 
and cable television) to offer equivalent services that have 
the potential to beneﬁt competition, but simultaneously 
enable offers of multiple services to the end user, which 
could give rise to new anti-competitive concerns. Certainly, a 
major development will be the fact that the majority of the 
world’s population will gain access to broadband services 
through the mobile Internet and not ﬁxed-line infrastructure. 
Operators of mobile networks may not necessarily be 
dominant by themselves, but could exercise oligopolistic 
market power with two or more operators controlling a 
market. To address these concerns, the author has developed 
a Layering Theory to more accurately deﬁne a relevant 
market in the Internet sector (Kariyawasam 2012: Chapter 5).
 
Accurate market deﬁnition is central to any competition 
investigation and the theory will assist regulators in assessing 
NGNs. The Layering Theory reinterprets the existing test of 
dominance and presents a revised version:
An undertaking shall be deemed to have Signiﬁcant 
Market Power [dominance] if either individually or 
jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent 
to dominance for the relevant Component Part in a 
particular Layer (as set out in Schedule 1) in the supplier’s 
relevant geographic market, that is to say a position of 
economic strength affording it the power to behave to 
an appreciable extent independently of competitors, 
customers, and ultimately consumers.
This new test is a marked and novel departure from the 
current test established by the European Court of Justice in 
the case of United Brands.9  Currently, the test of dominance 
is a cornerstone of the European Commission’s policy of 
delivering effective competition in Internet markets in 
Europe. The reinterpretation of the dominance test given 
above could be central to achieving higher standards in 
ensuring the neutrality of the Internet, privacy for end users, 
and lower consumer prices through effective competition.10 
The upside of the more ﬂexible structure of NGNs is that 
Services commonly known as “basic” telecommunications are 
formally referred to in the Annex on Telecommunications as “public 
telecommunications transport networks and services” (PTTNS) and are 
deﬁned therein.
And perhaps a mandate not to obstruct or otherwise impede or 
interfere with transiting trafﬁc (thanks to Nick-Ashton Hart for this 
suggestion).
United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission 
of the European Communities, Case 27/76, ECR 1978, 207, para. 38.
The author has recently completed a two year research project funded 
as part of a British Academy fellowship looking at the application of the 
Layering Theory to network neutrality, privacy and market competition, 
and where he interviewed a range of telecommunication operators, ISPs 
and regulators.
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7they will allow operators to provide a wide spectrum of 
services and networks within one or simultaneously several 
layers. The downside is the creation of a much more complex 
market environment where an operator may have market 
power in one layer, but not another, or the possibility to 
leverage its market power from one “downstream” to several 
“upstream” layers. This creates a potential problem for 
maintaining the neutrality of the Net with discrimination 
and the shaping of data trafﬁc across networks, and a 
potential regulatory quagmire for national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) who, faced with the task of having to 
deﬁne a relevant market to check for abuse of market power 
for competition purposes, have to “unpick services” that 
interconnect and access simultaneously at different layers of 
the service stack. A number of states around the world have 
already introduced net neutrality laws with mixed effect. In 
March 2015, the Federal Communications Commission in 
the US adopted an Open Internet Order to provide for Net 
neutrality by reclassifying broadband Internet access as a 
regulated telecommunications service.11 However, concerns 
still remain as to whether this will be effective in addressing 
access bottleneck issues to the Internet broadband market in 
the US, and particularly for smaller ISPs and SMEs.12 
Also, the Internet’s distributed network architecture powered 
by an exclusive number of Internet giants’ web of peering 
and transit agreements creates an ideal model for two-
sided competition platforms “where platform leaders can 
leverage higher margins to invest more in R&D or lower their 
prices, driving out weaker rivals.”13 Two-sided markets (or 
two-sided networks), are economic platforms having two 
distinct user groups that provide each other with network 
beneﬁts.14 They work particularly well in markets with 
network externalities, such as the Internet. Examples include 
social media; marketplaces; search engines; communication 
networks; credit cards; patients and doctors; advertisers 
and consumers; and video game consoles (gamers and 
developers), to name just a few. Consequently, mature two-
sided network industries can be dominated by small numbers 
of large platforms (for example, the credit card industry). In 
extreme situations, such as personal computer operating 
systems, a single company can emerge as a winner. As the 
Layering Theory test is based on assessing dominance in a 
single layer or multiple layers, it can capture the dominance 
effects of single or oligopoly dominance presented by two-
sided markets.
Although the Layering Theory is based on a test of 
dominance derived from European case law (United Brands), 
the test itself is based on concepts of market dominance and 
relevant market measurement that are used in the US and 
the EU. With BRIC countries, such as China and India, also 
adopting similar concepts of relevant market deﬁnition in 
their anti-monopoly law and competition acts respectively,15 
the likelihood of regulatory convergence in both northern 
and southern countries around use of the Layering Theory in 
deﬁning a new “major supplier” in a revised RP remains high. 
Further, the Layering Theory test for Signiﬁcant Market 
Power is a form of competition regulation that could be 
based on dynamic performance standards and that could 
help deliver on network neutrality. For example, E-Bay and 
Paypal are calling for a new mechanism for regulation in the 
electronic payments market that will be more ﬂexible and 
dynamic. Dynamic performance standards are “regulatory 
policies that measure results; that iterate based upon new 
data and new insights arrived at through a collaborative 
process.”16 The critical issue is in ensuring that regulators 
have access to real-time data points that generate a set of 
Big Data. This is now being achieved with some regulatory 
agencies, such as Ofcom in the United Kingdom (UK) and 
ARCEP in France, piloting network probes that collect data at 
designated network access points. As the E-Bay/Paypal report 
makes clear:
Introducing the data analytics element to regulation 
will greatly enhance the ability to measure and analyze 
performance standards. Creating a system where the 
regulated entities are subject to real-time measurement 
and algorithms that adapt to better achieve regulatory 
goals will ensure that the classical problems that 
performance standards had with monitoring and 
measurement are overcome. (p. 17)
By adopting a “critical mass” approach as seen in the 
regulatory process for negotiations around the WTO’s 
basic telecommunications agreement (fourth protocol), 
negotiations around a revised RP for Digital Trade could 
see any national regulatory authority worldwide providing 
effective competition in the delivery of publicly available 
networks and services. 
See full text of the FCC Open Internet Order, https://apps.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf.
See for example the Competify coalition of operators, ISPs, and end 
users arguing for a more competitive internet access market in the US, 
http://trycompetify.com/. See also the article by Nick Ashton-Hart on 
the signiﬁcance of the SME market to the digital economy as opposed 
to a small number of multinationals, “Why (Almost) Everything You 
Hear About the Digital Economy is Wrong”, http://blogs.cfr.org/
cyber/2015/08/12/why-almost-everything-you-hear-about-the-digital-
economy-is-wrong/.
For a general overview see “Two-sided Market Competition in 
Two-sided Networks,”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-sided_
market#Competition_in_Two-Sided_Networks.
Interestingly, the US, as well as China (Article 17, Anti-Monopoly Law, 
People’s Republic of China) and India (Chapter 2, Section 4, Indian 
Competition Act 2002—amended in 2007 and 2009) have adopted 
similar concepts of dominance to the test established in the European 
case of United Brands.
E-Bay/Paypal policy report on “21st Century Regulation: Putting 
Innovation at the Heart of Payments Regulation,” http://www.
ebaymainstreet.com/sites/default/ﬁles/PayPal-Payment-Regulations-
Booklet_US.pdf, p. 2. The author is grateful to Usman Ahmed for 
highlighting this paper, which provides very valuable information 
on how current regulatory techniques based on “old-world” design 
standards should change to cope with dynamic industries.
See note 14, Introduction.
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8There may be concerns in adopting a revised RP with 
enhanced competition provisions. For example, those states, 
such as China and India, with a high level of protection 
for state-owned telecommunication incumbents might 
consider that such competition provisions could erode 
their incumbents’ market share with a knock-on effect of 
reducing monopoly rents to their respective treasuries. There 
is ample evidence worldwide that increased liberalisation 
leads to not only increased foreign direct investment and 
increased productivity (particularly from the SME sector 
which is advantaged by more competitive and lower 
costs for access to network-based services), but also that 
improving the competitive environment for interconnection 
between networks increases licensing fees to the national 
regulator and end-user subscriber growth. States can phase 
the effect of increased liberalisation through adopting a 
revised RP, such as protecting national telecommunication 
incumbents’ service sectors that are services of a special 
and general economic interest. Such protections can be 
built into domestic law in advance of adopting a revised RP 
(Kariyawasam 2008). Also, with the rise of transnational 
corporations investing in product manufacture through 
global value chains and SMEs generating much of the trade in 
the digital economy, telecommunication operators who are 
keen to supply their national clients with services abroad will 
ﬁnd themselves an incumbent in their own markets, but new 
entrants in overseas markets. Companies such as Deutsche 
Telekom, dominant in Germany, would be just as keen to rely 
on a revised RP in entering China, as China Telecom would be 
in entering Germany.
The author has attached a revised version of the RP that 
incorporates the Layering Theory (Annex 1), which does 
not include other recommendations for change to the RP 
highlighted above but only the competition issues. The RP 
as it currently stands does not regulate the interconnection 
of Internet networks.17 This is a signiﬁcant weakness in WTO 
policy for the telecommunications sector. IP trafﬁc already 
exceeds conventional voice trafﬁc in terms of volume. As 
mentioned, most of the developed world will also soon be 
moving away from the use of IPv4 to IPv6, which will allow 
for a greater number of available IP addresses and enhanced 
service functionality. It is hard to imagine the sheer volume 
of data that will be generated by a plethora of new IPv6 
devices (the Internet of Things). At some point in the future, 
if WTO law is to keep pace with changing technology, 
the RP will also have to change. By amending the rules on 
interconnection in Section 2 of the RP to make it applicable 
to NGNs (in a technologically neutral way), ISPs will be in a 
much better position to command non-discriminatory and 
transparent interconnection at public and private Internet 
exchange points in the developed world and with one 
another in the developing world. This will enhance effective 
competition in world digital markets, which will, in turn, 
bring down end-user costs for access to the Internet and 
addressing digital divide issues (see Kariyawasam 2010). 
By ensuring a technologically neutral approach, as the 
underlying technology to networks change, the law retains 
its power to regulate for abuse of dominance.
OTHER ROUTES?
Another option would be to take the plurilateral approach 
by expanding the scope of the TiSA, for example, given that 
the agreement already involves negotiations between 25 
WTO negotiating parties representing at least 70 percent 
of the world trade in services.18 Perhaps the position has 
not been helped with the high level of conﬁdentiality 
surrounding the TiSA negotiations making transparency an 
issue for some of the smaller states who are net importers 
of IP.19 Also, negotiations around the free ﬂow of data across 
borders have been contentious (as they are in other FTAs 
currently being negotiated). The draft E-Commerce chapter 
appears to favour relevant domestic law on consumer 
protection for online transactions/e-commerce (Article 3) 
and personal information protection (Article 4). Interestingly, 
in Article 14 TiSA (as currently drafted), the US proposes 
that there should be no restrictions on any party taking any 
action to prevent a breach of “essential security interests,” 
although these interests remain undeﬁned. At the time 
of writing, the provisions on interoperability (Article 7) 
are insufﬁcient and lack precision, and although Article 
8 on open network access allows for a wide provision for 
consumers to use services and devices within the law, the 
right of service suppliers to use “any protocol of choice” is 
missing from the text (contrast this with the wording of 
the GATS Telecommunications Annex mentioned in Section 
3.4). Given that the TiSA is to be modelled on the GATS for 
future multilateralisation, this is an unfortunate omission. 
What is provided for is “interoperability of services and 
technologies where appropriate,” and which is not as wide 
as the GATS Telecommunications Annex provision. Under 
Article 9 (localisation provisions), there are naturally mixed 
views. There appears to be general consensus on mutual 
recognition of electronic signatures under Article 10 although 
some states will still require authentiﬁcation procedures 
to comply with an individual party’s law for a “certain 
category of transactions” (not deﬁned). In this respect, the 
TTIP negotiations appear to provide for better regulatory 
convergence in setting proportionate norms and standards 
in developing-technology sectors, such as cloud and smart 
This point is a contentious one. There is an argument that existing 
WTO commitments can cover Internet services unless speciﬁcally 
excluded. The argument centres on the deﬁnition given to a public 
telecommunications transport network or service, a full discussion 
of which is outside the scope of this paper. For further details, see 
Kariyawasam (2008: Chapter 3). 
Negotiating WTO members include Australia, Canada, Chile, Chinese 
Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, the EU, Hong Kong China, Iceland, Israel, 
Japan, Korea, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
States, and Uruguay. China has expressed interest in joining and this 
request has the support of the EU. See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/
policy/in-focus/tisa/.
The European Commission agreed to publish the negotiating mandate 
for the TiSA in March 2015. For the text of the mandate, see http://data.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6891-2013-ADD-1-DCL-1/en/
pdf. Also, several of the TiSA chapters have been released on Wikileaks.
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9cities, which could yield efﬁciency-saving costs for business 
and provide best-practice examples in other trade deals. 
Article 11 provides that customs duties will not apply to 
electronic transmissions, but that states reserve the right to 
impose internal taxes on transmissions as state domestic law 
requires. 
Despite the current differing positions on a number of 
important issues relevant to digital trade, the TiSA remains 
a viable option for progressing further commitments 
in this area. Based closely around the structure of the 
GATS, existing schedules of new rules in electronic 
commerce and telecommunications could be presented as 
additional commitments under Article XVIII of the GATS 
either as reference papers and/or as new understandings 
on commitments. Horizontal provisions (on domestic 
regulation) that cover all services could be included as a new 
Annex to the GATS. Subject to a critical mass being reached 
in TiSA membership, it could then be folded into the GATS. 
Alternatively, we could move away from the current GATS-/
GATT-/TRIPS- and FTA-based models and adopt a new 
Framework Convention on Digital Trade together with 
separate protocols for services, goods, and IP.20 Some would 
argue that this is simply replacing one set of umbrella and 
subsidiary agreements (the WTO framework and covered 
instruments) with another, but the advantage of decoupling 
ancillary and contentious trade-related matters, such as 
agriculture, subsidies, and so on, and focusing purely on 
digital trade may be a good way forward. As Matz Luck 
argues in her paper “Framework Conventions as a Regulatory 
Tool” (Matz Luck 2009), “The regulation of international 
issues by framework conventions is a relatively recent 
regulatory technique in international law and has mainly 
been employed in the ﬁeld of international environmental 
law.” She does not discuss framework conventions in the 
context of digital trade, but does set out some examples 
where this form of treaty structure has been used 
(Framework Convention on the Ozone Layer; Convention on 
Climate Change; and Convention on Biological Diversity, to 
name a few). Framework agreements are usually associated 
with a “framework convention and protocol approach” by 
which parties agree on a more general treaty, the framework 
convention, and more speciﬁc protocols to complete the 
detail missing from the higher umbrella legal framework. 
The framework agreement is a broad treaty whereas the 
protocols are more speciﬁc and detailed treaties (Matz Luck 
2009: 452). Signiﬁcantly, only parties to the framework 
agreement can become members of the corresponding 
protocol(s).. How might this look? 
A Framework Convention on Digital Trade could include 
horizontal (non-exhaustive) provisions on competition 
(cartels, abuse of dominance and collusive agreements, 
and so on); payments; security (that is, encryption); privacy 
norms (processing of data in the ordinary course of business, 
cross-border data transfer); authentication (electronic 
signatures); and dispute resolution. As regards dispute 
resolution, it would be the role of the WTO to either modify 
existing provisions on dispute settlement to take account 
of small value transactions or encourage member-state 
commitments on alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and 
requiring member states to cooperate on enforcement of 
outcomes. The framework convention could be negotiated 
in parallel or separately with a Digital Services Protocol that 
could include terms incorporating the framework convention; 
terms for a legal deﬁnition of services incorporating 
relevant guidelines on use of CPC, WS120 classiﬁcation 
codes; and an annex of participating countries. Similarly, a 
Digital Goods Protocol could include terms incorporating 
the framework convention; terms for a legal deﬁnition of 
goods incorporating Harmonised System (HS) classiﬁcation 
guidelines; and an annex of participating countries. Finally, an 
IP Protocol would include similar provisions to the Services 
and Goods protocols, but also would incorporate the terms 
of the WIPO Internet treaties; provisions on counterfeit 
trade; exhaustion; enforcement; and so on, drawn from 
best practice FTA/PTA agreements; fair use to copyright 
exceptions; and an Annex of participating countries. The 
advantage of a framework/protocol treaty approach would 
be that for those countries that wish to categorise the same 
intangible differently (for example, audiovisual media), this 
would allow for such ﬂexibility, but still apply a degree of 
uniformity with regard to acceptance by all parties of the 
“horizontal” provisions in the mother framework convention.
 
The signiﬁcant issue is whether the framework convention 
should be negotiated within or outside of the WTO. There 
are merits and demerits to both approaches. Negotiating as 
a plurilateral outside the WTO would allow for decoupling 
of other contentious trade issues, as mentioned above, but 
would perhaps narrow the remit of participating countries to 
those like-minded states favouring stronger IP protection and 
no customs duties on electronic transmissions or localisation 
requirements. It would be difﬁcult to see the appeal of such a 
convention to a range of developing countries who, with take 
up of the mobile Internet, are the next emerging markets 
for digital economy services. Negotiating within the WTO 
would allow for a plurilateral start with the prospect of faster 
multilateralisation. The special and differential rights found 
within existing WTO jurisprudence could be more readily 
applied to a framework convention on digital trade, and 
there are better enforcement prospects through the WTO’s 
DSB mechanism, although as highlighted earlier in this 
paper, the use of the DSB will not be practical for small-value 
transactions and other forms of ADR will be required. 
The Internet and Digital Ecosystem Alliance/International Digital 
Economy Alliance (IDEA) suggests use of a Framework Convention 
where there is legal uncertainty, for example, where states have not 
been able to reach agreement on important issues, such as on cross-
border data ﬂows, perhaps because the legal position in the TiSA 
remains unconﬁrmed. The IDEA refers to a successful example of 
a framework convention, the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in “The Trillion 
Dollar Question: How Trade Agreements Can Maximise the Economic 
Potential of Data in the Networked Economy and Support the Internet 
as the World’s Trading Platform.” 
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There is no doubt that with the failure to progress effectively 
through the Doha Round, the Quad countries (US, EU, 
Canada, and Japan) have pursued their interests in digital 
trade through a series of PTAs. These developments have 
no longer remained the preserve of the Quad but have 
expanded to other nation states interested in the export of 
IP. This paper has brieﬂy looked at some of the more recent 
and larger FTAs, although many of the operative provisions 
for some, such as the TiSA, are still not in the public domain. 
Nevertheless, the wording of provisions in agreements, such 
as the KORUS, provides a good overview of what has been 
achieved. Other writers, such as Wunsch-Vincent (2008), 
have argued that what needs to happen now is for the 
wording of some of these provisions to be used to progress 
commitments through the multilateral process in the WTO. 
There is much to be said for this approach in creating a more 
harmonised regulatory environment where the costs for 
doing business and generating trade are not escalated by 
fragmented regulatory processes created by a complex web 
of international treaties and domestic law, and where it may 
not necessarily be clear to contracting states as to what 
obligations apply both for international investors and home 
states keen on attracting such investment. Also, such states 
will be wary of opening up markets to foreign competition 
when domestic providers remain uncompetitive. Dispute 
resolution procedures in FTAs/PTAs are not uniform and 
there is concern that judgments, perhaps through private 
arbitration procedures, will create a patchwork of rules for 
digital trade. Certainly, the WTO could strengthen its role 
in monitoring the performance and impact of the new PTAs 
on the horizon, in effect becoming a more signiﬁcant source 
of information on these agreements than previously and 
matching its existing strengths in adjudication (dispute 
settlement) and negotiation (namely, the ITA).
Regulation in the communications sector has generally 
favoured separating content from infrastructure and there 
are great merits to this approach. Regulation of content, 
such as defamation, indecency, laws on ﬁnancial services, 
advertising, and so on, are best left to the preserve of 
domestic and/or regional law. Nevertheless, when it comes 
to delivering digital products (whether goods and/or services) 
over a network, the very nature of the delivery method 
requires a holistic view to traditionally separate goods and 
services regulation, content, and infrastructure regulation. 
This paper points to (a) expanding and deepening existing 
WTO commitments; (b) encouraging the WTO Secretariat to 
ensure that amendments to the TiSA are made in line with 
existing GATS commitments and/or improving upon current 
provisions speciﬁcally for digital trade; or (c) pursuing a single 
new instrument for the digital economy.
CONCLUSION 
A speciﬁc summary of reforms would include the following.
•	 Incorporating	 best-practice	 provisions	 from	 FTAs/
PTAS on exceptions to copyright, and particularly fair-
use provisions that would apply in the digital domain. 
 
•	 Incorporating	 higher	 IP	 standards	 and	 enforcement,	
and particularly criminal sanctions for commercial 
counterfeit trade.     
 
•	 A	 Revised	 Reference	 Paper	 to	 the	 GATS	 could	 include	
speciﬁc additional provisions on ensuring no restrictions 
to cross-border data ﬂows and minimising localisation 
requirements (reﬂecting best practice from FTAs/
PTAs), but making clear whether all forms of data, or 
only certain categories of data, are captured.  
 
•	 Reviewing	 the	 distinction	 between	 “basic”	 and	
“enhanced” classiﬁcation of telecommunication 
services—should the distinction be eliminated in the 
light of delivery of services over NGN networks and the 
Internet of Things?  
•	 Revising	 the	 schedules	 of	 specific	 commitments	 in	 the	
area of the digital economy so that they are presented in 
clusters of network-based services;   
 
•	 Raising	 and	 harmonising	 the	 de	 minimis	 level	 for	
customs border tariffs to US$800;   
 
•	 Clarifying	 interpretation	of	the	Annex	on	Telecoms	with	
respect to protocol of choice and meaning of real-time 
data and data without amendment to content and form; 
 
•	 Expanding	the	regulatory	reference	paper	to	cover:	
 
- both basic and enhanced telecommunication 
services (eliminating the distinction between basic 
and enhanced);     
 
- provisions on network neutrality, mandated access, 
and interoperability; and    
 
- enhanced provisions on interconnection and 
competition to capture NGNs; and the use of 
dynamic performance standards in competition 
tests for networks with high levels of network 
externalities (the reinterpretation of the deﬁnition 
of a “major supplier” in the Reference Paper to cover 
a new test of “dominance”).   
 
•	 Deepening	 commitments	 in	 TiSA	 negotiations	 for	
digital trade and ensuring conformity with existing 
GATS obligations (for example, the Annex on 
Telecommunications and Reference Paper);   
   
•	 The	use	of	a	Framework	Convention	for	Digital	Trade	as	a	
separate PTA within the remit of the WTO.
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DEFINITIONS
Users means electronic communications network and service 
consumers and electronic communications network and 
service suppliers.
Major Supplier means “a supplier who either individually or 
jointly with others enjoys a position equivalent to dominance 
for the relevant Component Part in a particular Layer (as 
set out in Schedule 1) in the supplier’s relevant geographic 
market”, meaning, a position of economic strength 
granting it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of competitors, customers, and ultimately 
consumers.
Electronic Communications Networks means “transmission 
systems, including switching or routing equipment integral 
to maintenance of interconnection, addressing and other 
resources, that together make possible connection between 
two or more points in a network over any of the Layers as 
deﬁned in Schedule I irrespective of the type of information 
conveyed”.
Electronic Communications Service means “a service normally 
provided for remuneration for which the conveyance of 
signals over electronic communications networks is integral 
to the Service, and whose Component Part(s) fall into any 
of the Layers as deﬁned in Schedule I, but excluding services 
providing, or exercising editorial control over, content 
transmitted using electronic communications networks and 
services. An Electronic Communications Service may consist 
of one or several Component Parts.”
Component Part means “a physical or logical part of an 
Electronic Communications Service and which is logically 
associated with one [or more] of the Layers as deﬁned in 
Schedule I”.
Access means “the making available of facilities and/or 
services, to another undertaking, under deﬁned [agreed] 
conditions, on any basis for the purpose of providing 
electronic communications services”.
Interconnection means “the physical and logical linking of 
public electronic communications networks used by one or 
more undertakings to facilitate the users of an undertaking 
to communicate with other users of the same or another 
undertaking, or to access electronic communications services 
provided by another undertaking. Electronic communications 
services may be provided by the parties involved or other 
parties who have access to the network. Interconnection is a 
speciﬁc type of access implemented between public network 
operators.”
1. Competitive safeguards
1.1. Prevention of anti-competitive practices in 
telecommunications
 Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the 
purpose of preventing suppliers, who alone or together 
are a major supplier, from engaging in or continuing 
anti-competitive practices.
1.2. Safeguards
 The anti-competitive practices referred to above shall 
include in particular:
(a)  engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidisation;
(b)  using information obtained from competitors with 
anti-competitive results; and
(c)  not making available to other services suppliers 
on a timely basis technical information on 
electronic communications networks and services 
and commercially relevant information which 
are necessary for them to provide electronic 
communications services.
2. Interconnection
2.1. This section applies to linking with suppliers providing 
public electronic communications networks and 
services in order to allow the users of one supplier to 
communicate with users of another supplier and to 
access services provided by another supplier, where 
speciﬁc commitments are undertaken.
2.2. Interconnection and access to be ensured
2.2.1.Interconnection with a major supplier will be 
ensured at any technically feasible point in the 
network. Such interconnection is provided:
ANNEX 1
REVISED FORM OF THE 
REGULATORY REFERENCE 
PAPER (COMPETITION 
AND INTERCONNECTION 
PROVISIONS ONLY)
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(a) under non-discriminatory terms, conditions 
(including technical standards and 
speciﬁcations), and rates and of a quality 
no less favourable than that provided for 
its own like services or for like services of 
non-afﬁliated service suppliers or for its 
subsidiaries or other afﬁliates;
(b) in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions 
(including technical standards and 
speciﬁcations), and cost-oriented rates that 
are transparent, reasonable, having regard 
to economic feasibility, and sufﬁciently 
unbundled so that the supplier need not 
pay for network components or facilities 
that it does not require for the service to be 
provided; and
(c) upon request, at points in addition to the 
network termination points offered to the 
majority of users, subject to charges that 
reﬂect the cost of construction of necessary 
additional facilities.
2.2.2.Access with a major supplier will be ensured at any 
technically feasible point in the network. A major 
supplier must meet all reasonable requests for 
access.
2.3. Public availability of the procedures for interconnection 
and/or access negotiations
 The procedures applicable for interconnection and/
or access to a major supplier will be made publicly 
available.
2.4. Transparency of interconnection arrangements
 It is ensured that a major supplier will make publicly 
available either its interconnection agreements or a 
reference interconnection offer.
2.5. Interconnection and access: dispute settlement
 A service supplier requesting interconnection and/or 
with a major supplier will have recourse, either:
 (a)   at any time or
(b)  after a reasonable period of time which has been 
made publicly known
to an independent domestic body, which may be a 
regulatory body as referred to in paragraph 5 below, to 
resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, conditions and 
rates for interconnection and/or access within a reasonable 
period of time, to the extent that these have not been 
established previously ...
Schedule 1
LAYER 4 CONTENT
LAYER 3 APPLICATIONS
LAYER 2 TRANSPORT
LAYER 1 ACCESS
Implemented jointly by ICTSD and the World Economic 
Forum, the E15Initiative convenes world-class experts 
and institutions to generate strategic analysis and 
recommendations for government, business, and civil 
society geared towards strengthening the global trade 
and investment system for sustainable development.
Implemented jointly by ICTSD and the World Economic 
Forum, the E15Initiative convenes world-class experts 
and institutions to generate strategic analysis and 
recommendations for government, business and civil 
society geared towards strengthening the global trade 
system.
